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Summary findings
It has recently been proposed that banks be allowed to  chiefly at times of systemic crisis. And using agencies'
hold less capital against loans to borrowers who have  individual ratings is unlikely to be an effective early-
received a favorable rating by an approved rating agency.  warning system for the risk of systemic failure, so use of
But a plausible model of rating-agency behavior shows  the ratings could lull policymakers into a false sense of
that this strategy could have perverse results, actually  security.
increasing the risk of deposit insurance outlays.  It is important to harness market information to
First, there is an issue of signaling, with low-ability  improve bank safety (for example, by increasing the role
borrowers possibly altering their behavior to secure a  of large, well-informed, but uninsured claimants), but
lower capital requirement for their borrowing.  this particular approach could be counterproductive.
Second, establishing a regulatory cut-off may actually  Relying on ratings could induce borrowers to increase
reduce the amount of risk information made available by  their exposure to systemic risk even if they reduce
raters.  exposure to specific risk.
Besides, the credibility of rating agencies may not be
damaged by neglect of the risk of unusual systemic
shocks, although deposit insurers greatest outlays come
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It has recently  been  proposed' that banks should  be allowed  to hold less capital  against
loans  to borrowers  who  have received  a favorable  rating by an approved  rating agency.
The objective  is an improved  allocation  of bank capital  and risk, and lower  exposure  to
bank failure.
But a plausible  model  of rating agency  behavior  shows  that this strategy  can have
perverse  results, actually  increasing  the risk of deposit  insurance  outlays.
A number  of different  critiques  are relevant. 2 For instance,  while capital  is intended  to
cope  with unexpected  loan-losses,  ratings  are more  strongly  related  to expected  default
rates,  than to the standard  deviation  or risk of default  (and of course  they don't  take
account  of correlations  between  different  loans  in the portfolio). 3
There is also the question  of how  important  it is for rating  agencies  to retain  credibility  by
posting  ratings  for bank loans  that will prove  to be expost accurate. After  all, in contrast
to the situation  with rating tradable  bonds (where  rating agencies  mediate  the conflicting
interests  of investors  and issuers),  bank and borrower  share  an interest  in reducing  the
burden  of regulatory  capital  by securing  a favorable  rating for the borrower.
Furthermore,  one may ask just how reliable  the rating  agencies  would  be, especially  in
developing  countries  where information  costs are high and where  the ratings  profession  is
in its infancy  if it exists  at all. Will there  be issues  of market  power  and concentration?
In the June 1999  consultative  document  "A New  Capital  Adequacy  Framework"  of the Basel Committee
on Banking  Supervision.
2 There  have been  a number  of other  recent  critiques  of the incentive  structure  facing  rating  agencies,  cf.
Kuhner  (1999),  Partnoy  (1999). For an overview  of the regulatory  use of rating  agencies,  see Adams  et al.
(1999).
3 While  standard  deviation  of default  percentages  from B rated securities  in the US is 3.8  times higher  than
those of AA rated securities;  the mean  default  percentage  of B rated securities  is fully 11.7  times  higher
than  that of the AA rated. Note also  that  the Basel  proposal  does  not closely  tie the differential  capital
requirements  to varying  default  percentages.  For example,  lending  to corporates  rated  A are shown  in the
proposal  as requiring  5 times  the capital  required  for those  rated AA,  whereas  historical  experience
indicates  a mean  default  rate  only 75 per cent higher  and a standard  deviation  only  60 per cent higher. Cf.
Adams  et al. (1999),  Caprio  and Honohan  (2000).
2But our purpose here is to abstract from most of these questions to focus on the incentive
structure in a model of competitive banking and rating, with free entry and substantial
access by market participants to information. We show that even here there can be
perverse effects from the introduction of more liberal capital requirements for lending to
firms that receive favorable ratings.
We outline a model of bank lending under uncertainty to borrowers of different abilities.
Well-informed and competitive banks comply with minimum capital requirements.  They
have access to an infinitely elastic supply of deposits, and these deposits are insured by a
public insurer, whose expected payout will be the focus of our attention.
The capital requirements are differentiated according to whether the borrower has been
(favorably) rated or not.  The expected default percentage of rated borrowers is set to
satisfy a certain threshold by rating agencies. Borrowers of different abilities choose the
risk profile of their projects based both on systemic and specific risk factors. Low ability
borrowers may choose a safer profile in order to secure a rating.
Our model reveals three main underlying problems.  First, an issue of signaling, whereby
low-ability borrowers may alter their behavior in order to secure a favorable rating and
hence a lower capital requirement for their borrowing, even though they continue to place
banks, and the deposit insurer, at risk.  Second, the establishment of a regulatory cut-off
may actually reduce the amount of risk information made available by raters. Third, even
though rating agency credibility may require the average default percentage of rated
companies to correspond to understood thresholds in normal times, they will not
normally have an incentive to factor-in the risk of unusual systemic shocks, but it is these
that cause the major surges in fiscal (deposit insurance) outlays.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the risk and return opportunities of
different classes of borrower. Section 3 describes the debt contract and the assumptions
regarding the rating agencies.  Section 4 analyses the banks' decisions, explores the
conditions under which banks may fail, defining the efficient capital requirement, i.e. the
minimum requirement to avoid failure and deriving the competitive equilibrium interest
rate.  Section 5 explores the impact of ratings-related capital requirements on contracts
and behavior.  Section 6 provides two specific examples to confirm that perverse results
can arise.  Leaving the model, section 7 provides a brief intuitive discussion of the nature
and source of the distortions.  Section 8 concludes.
2.  Risk and return for the borrowers
Our model distinguishes between systemic risk - associated with the potential for bank
failures, and specific risk.  Systemic risk is modeled by assuming that there are two
possible states of the world s, s =0 is the good state and and s = 1 is the bad state.  The
probability of the bad state or systemic crash Prob  {s = 1  }= xr. Each period is a one-shot
event with no consequence for subsequent periods.
3The entrepreneurs in the model are risk-neutral, and each entrepreneur k is endowed with
a specific ability or type ak s [ao,a,]. Each can choose risk parameters Uk> 0 and vk, with
-uk < Vk.  The entrepreneur must invest $1 in the project, which she does not have and so
must borrow. (We need to have different abilities/types because otherwise all
entrepreneurs will behave the same way and there will be no reason for rating and capital
differentiation)
The gross return on the project to an entrepreneur of ability a and chosen risk parameters
u, v is aX(u,v,s) if the project succeeds, which happens with probability p(u,v,s);
otherwise the project fails and the return is 0. (Note the implication thatpi<O; p2<0;
p3< 0 ).
In what follows  we assume  that:  p(u,v,s)  = 1 - u - sv.  Conditional  on the good state,  the
mean failure rate is just the specific risk u.  The unconditional mean failure rate is
9 =  U +±  V.
The expected gross return on the project is then E(u,v;a) =a  |p(u,v,s)X(u,v,s)ds  . We
further simplify by taking X(u,v,s) -X(u,v).  Therefore
F.(u,  v;a)  =  (I -0) aX(u, v)  (1)
Following de Meza and Webb (1999), we take Xto  be increasing and convex in both risk
arguments, and assume that the expected return E is a hump-shaped function of risk, at
first increasing, but eventually decreasing in each risk parameter conditional on any value
of the other.
3.  Ratings and the debt contract
A rating agency can discover, at cost c, enough information about the value of a, u and v
to compute the mean failure rate.  It may assign a public rating z, 0 < z < 1 to the
entrepreneur such that the mean failure rate of all entrepreneurs with rating z is no greater
than z.  Borrowers can pay for the rating, and competition between raters will drive the
price to c.  With free entry, there must be some similar regulatory procedure or incentive
structure for ensuring that the implicit default rate in the bank loan ratings prepared for
the purpose of determining capital requirements is not systematically biased (though we
leave it open as to whether the agency rates for specific risk only, or for unconditional
risk).  Thus we assume that the mean default rate of rated firms is no greater than an
externally targeted rate So.
The debt contract offered by banks is such that D is repaid unless the project fails, in
which case nothing is paid.  We can think of D as one plus the lending interest rate. The
entrepreneur of type a thus chooses u, v to maximize net return on the project,
(1 -fJ)  [aX(u,v)-D].
4If the borrower can alter the repayment D by varying risk u,v an interior solution {u(a,D),
v(a,D)} will satisfy the first order conditions (2): (where the dependence of D on u or v is
only relevant if presented as a contractual schedule or menu to the entrepreneur).
aX.  - D.  1 (2')
aX-D
aX,  -D,  IC
aX-D  (2")
These conditions are similar to those in de Meza and Webb (1999) and have the same
properties that an entrepreneur of higher ability a will choose less risky projects, and that,
conditional on ability, a higher value of D induces higher risk.
4.  Bank behavior and bank failure.
The banker invests own resources and accepts deposits; the assets of the bank are just
loans.  Each bank has access to unlimited (insured) deposit funds which it is obliged to
repay (we assume zero interest).  If the bank is unable to pay, the deposit insurer pays out
the net deficit to the depositors.  The bank must hold regulatory capital ratio y  against
loans. This regulatory capital y means that, for every ($1 dollar) loan made, deposits do
not exceed 1-y.  (In section 5 below we introduce the idea that this capital ratio may be
made conditional on a rating, but in this section we take it to be the same for all loans).
Our banks have much information: each can observe a, u, v and z.  Therefore the
repayment contract can depend on these variables D=D(u,v;a,z).
Each bank maximizes its expected return by offering contracts to as many borrowers as
possible.  The expected return to the bank can be thought of as chiefly coming from the
good state; in the bad state the bank may fail.  In order to see this we begin with the case
where there is only one type a, and an undifferentiated capital requirement y. In
equilibrium, the bank will offer the same contract to all.  The bank's expected return here
per dollar lent will be:
B = (l-r)[(l-u)D  - (1-y)] + 7r max{O,[(l-u-v)D  - (1-y)]}  (3)
In the bad state, the deposit insurer will have to make a payout unless the contractual
payment (repayment plus interest) is sufficient to payoff all depositors from performing
loans:
1-p'
D 2  . (Condition F)  (4)
1-u-v
We distinguish three cases: first, the safe  or "restrained" case where the regulatory
capital y is so high that  F is satisfied with strict inequality; second the efficient case
where F holds with equality; third the failure case where F is not satisfied.
5If condition F is not satisfied, the payout made by the deposit insurer in the bad state is:
(l-y)-(l-u-v)D.  Note that the payout is higher, the higher is v.
Assuming free entry of banks, competition between banks will drive the contractual
repayment down to the point where the return B is just sufficient to remunerate the
capital.  If the regulatory capital minimum is binding, then this implies B = y.
In the efficient or failure cases this no-profit condition implies:
D-  l-7(l  -r) D  1  - (l  - u)  (Condition P)  (5)
Combining equality in the safety condition F with the no-profit condition P allows us to
determine the efficient capital requirement y* (i.e. the minimum capital that will avoid
failure) as a furtction of the risk parameters:
1/*  1+  1-u  (6)
uv-,(u  +v)  (
In the safe or "restrained" case where capital requirements are strictly in excess of y*
bank failure is impossible.  The equilibrium contract in that case is obtained from
substituting the no profit condition B = y into (3) above, where the second term on the
right hand side is now strictly positive, yielding:
(I-u-aV)
Combining (5), (5') allows us to plot the equilibrium contract D, conditional on u, as a
function of the minimum capital y. (Figure 1).
(Of course it must be borne in mind here that the risk parameters are in turn determined
by the repayment D, though (2).  Since both (2) and (5) determine monotonically
increasing relationships between u and D, the possibility of multiple equilibria arises.
We assume that the return function Xis  such that the slope of the relationship from (2) is
uniformly shallower, so that there is an unique equilibrium).
Like the condition for safety, the contractual payment determined by competition is
increasing in the capital ratio (up to y*), and increasing in the risk of default in good
times (1-u).  On the other hand it is also sensitive to the risk of the bad state occurring,
but not to the loan-loss risk conditional on the bad state, i.e. v.  Given that the expected
deposit insurance payout is dependent on v, this dramatizes the conflict between social
and private goals.
65.  The impact of ratings-related capital requirements on contracts and
behavior
Suppose now that there are just two types of entrepreneur Hand  L, with abilities aH>aL.
For a given repayment contract D, type H will choose lower risk:  u(aH;D) < u(aL;D) and
v(aH,D) < v(aL;D).  Assuming that these abilities can be observed, the contracts will be
differentiated and the no-profit condition will determine two contracts DH < DL.
We now introduce the concept of having capital requirements depend on ratings.
Specifically, we postulate that the regulator sets the capital requirement in respect of a
borrower who has received a favorable rating at a lower rate yo  < Yi. Further, suppose
that these regulatory capital requirements are the efficient levels corresponding to types H
and L respectively, i.e. yo  (yr) is the rate determined by equation (6) above for the risk
choices made by H (L).
There may not be an exact correspondence between ability and rating.  In particular, the
prospect of a better loan contract may induce low ability borrowers to choose a risk
profile so cautious that it secures them a favorable rating.  The bank will not be fooled by
this, but it too will take advantage of the lower capital requirement.
Thus we need to take account of four different contracts D(a,y) satisfying the
(competitive) no-profit condition P; they correspond to the two levels of ability and the
two capital requirements. We may ignore the high capital high ability contract, which
only becomes relevant if the cost of rating is so high that even high ability borrowers
choose not to be rated, in which case the rating agencies play no further role.
The other three contracts are D(aH,yo) < D(aL,yo) < D(aL,yi). The middle one is the
interesting and problematic contract offered to low ability borrowers L who have
obtained a rating.  Since the loan can qualify for the lower capital requirement, the bank
can break-even with a lower-interest contract than the no-profit equilibrium contract for
low ability entrepreneurs and high capital.  But use of this middle contract places the
deposit insurer at risk.
Since yo(yL)  are the efficient capital requirements for ability level H(L), the system is no
longer sure to satisfy the safety condition F unless the L borrowers do not find it desirable
to obtain a rating.  If they do get a rating, and borrow at the middle contract D(aL,yo),  the
lower capital yo  will be insufficient in the bad state to protect any bank which has lent to
them.4
Here is where the role of the rating agencies comes to the fore.  Recall that they can
acquire information about the borrowers at cost c.  Will this cost be sufficiently small,
from the L borrower's point of view, to be worth paying in terms of the lower repayment?
4 The entrepreneur  will respond  to the lower  interest  rate by lowering  risk, but not by enough  to avoid
violating  the safety condition  F.  Furthermore,  we can see from (2) above  that  the cost  c incurred  by the
borrower  in obtaining  the rating  will tend to increase  the risk  level chosen by the borrower.
7From the assumption (made above) that the rater's reputation requires unbiased default
probabilities for rated borrowers, the mean 5 default rate of rated firms will be no greater
than the externally targeted rate OoŽOH. Denoting the proportion of low-ability firms by
A,  and the choice of default rate of high ability firms by OH  then the low ability firms can
be rated provided their default rate OL satisfies (1-X)OH  +  XOL  < So; i.e. if
_0  _  )H>0  (7) OL < 0, =  S  (1A  ),S  7
Thus, provided the high ability borrowers are choosing a default rate strictly lower than
the target rate So,  the low ability borrowers will in practice be set a more lenient target
01> Oo.
However, lending to the low ability borrowers with low capital will be an equilibrium
only if the best contract satisfying the no-profit condition gives the low ability borrower a
better return (net of the costs of achieving a rating, and taking account of the impact on
gross return of the risk choices made to secure the rating) than does the best high capital
contract.  We now examine the conditions under which this will be the case.
To get a rating, the low ability entrepreneurs will have to choose risk parameter values
satisfying either (8a) or (8b), depending on whether ratings are based on specific risk
alone (good state) or on unconditional risk:
I - u  < 01  (8a).
1-u - 7ZV  < 01  (8b).
Subject to this, the borrower will choose the most favorable balance between specific and
systemic risk u and v. For example, at an interior solution from a continuous range, the
chosen u,v will satisfy a first-order condition corresponding to (2):
Xv,-  D, = 7E(X- Dy)  (8')
Writing the choice of u and v satisfying the rating-constrained contract (8a or b), (8') as
u(aL,D(aL,yo),01),  v(aL,D(aL,yo),01),  the condition for the low ability entrepreneur to opt
for a rating is:
{  1-  01}  {azlXu(aL,D(aL,yo),01),  v(aL,D(aL,yo),01)]  - D(aL,yo)  - c}
> {1  - 6(aL,D(aL,yl))}  {aLX[u(aL,D(aL,yl)),  v(aL,D(aL,yl)]  - D(aL,yl)}  (9)
Evidently, this depends sensitively on the pay-off function X as well as on the loan
contract terms. In two special cases discussed in the next section, we see that the low
ability borrower L may opt for rating, and how this can work out to the disadvantage of
the deposit insurance fund.
5 As discussed below, this may be either the unconditional default rate, or the default rate conditional on the
good state.
86.  Two specific examples
In order to provide a more precise and explicit illustration of what can go wrong when
lending to rated firms requires less capital, this section examines two special cases for the
return function X(u,v), still where there are just two ability types aL < aH, (and where, for
simplicity, the resource cost c of lending is negligible).
Both examples exploit the fact that, unless the capital requirements are high enough to
avoid bank failure in the bad state, the choice of higher v entails higher expected deposit
insurance outlay, without having any effect on the bank's return.
Special case (i)
First suppose that X(u,v) only depends on the default probability 0 = u+xrv,  and that there
are just two possible choices of 0: 00 < 01, (though firms can freely choose u, with v
deduced along the corresponding trade-off).  In this special case we also assume that, as
discussed above, the rating agency rates firms based only on their "good state" default
probability u.
Provided the safe choice So  gives the better expected gross return (i.e. before repayment
to the banks), there will then exist a range of values for D such that L will choose high
risk 01 and H will choose low risk 00. (This can be seen from Figure 1 which plots the
net return 0,(X(0,) - D/a) against Dla for each of the two values of i).  The crossover
point defines the critical value d*.  Then for values of D such that:
- <  D <-,
aL  aH
the low ability borrower will continue to choose high risk, while the high ability borrower
chooses low risk.  By equation (5') above a restrained (high capital) banking system will
not, therefore offer the same contract to both types.  But a bank which is allowed to
maintain low capital against a rated borrower will be happy to offer a low D, based on a
low u, even if that borrower retains high risk by shifting between u and v retaining the
overall default rate 0 while increasing the size of the deposit insurer's loss in the bad
state.
Special case (ii)
Alternatively, suppose there are two possible values for each risk parameter uo < ul and vo
< v,, giving four alternative risk choices.  Suppose that any risk choice other than (ul,vl)
qualifies a borrower for a rating.
The potential social impact, of a lighter capital requirement being allowed for rated
borrowers depends on whether the ligher capital requirement induces low ability
borrowers to switch to vl.  If a low ability borrower chooses uo in order to get a lower D
offered by the bank, as a result of the no-profit condition (5), can this result in the
9borrower switching from vo  to vl, thereby increasing the expected outlay of the deposit
insurer?  The answer is yes.
Figure 3 indicates the different configurations that are possible.  Writing X(u,,vj) as Xv,
etc., it plots the expected return OU,(Xt-D)  to the borrower, depending on the risk choices
and the terms of the lending contract D.  For any given D, the borrower chooses the
highest value - the outer envelope.  The solid lines thus show the choices involving high
systemic risk.  The plots in both panels satisfy
Xi I> Xio > XoI  > Xoo
and
Oil> Oio  > 001> 000.
In the upper panel, the borrower's preferred choice of systemic risk is always v, and does
not depend on D.  (This will happen, for example, if the probability 7r  of the bad state is
very low). But, as illustrated by the lower panel of Figure 3, there can be a range of
values of D which induce low systemic risk vo whereas for lower values of D high
systemic risk v, is chosen. 6 What is happening here is that, if the gain in return for higher
systemic risk v is sufficiently higher when specific risk u is lower, then a more favorable
loan contract (low value of D) could induce the low ability firm to opt for higher systemic
risk vi, while still retaining its rating by switching to the low value of specific risk uo.7
Thus, in this example, by lowering the competitive repayment contract D offered by
banks to rated borrowers, the introduction of ratings-related capital requirements actually
increases the systemic risk v and hence the expected outlay of the deposit insurer.
7.  Discussion: distortions from the rating system
We now see the nature of the costs potentially introduced by the rating system.  First is
the fiscal (deposit insurance fund) cost incurred in the bad state when banks fail because
they offered the low-ability borrowers the contract based on low capital D(aL,yo). This
contract may have been good for the bank ex ante, but embodies too little capital for the
bank to survive in the bad state. The level of capital yo  is the efficient capital requirement
for firms of type H, and is not enough to protect the bank from failure if it lends to firms
of type L, even if those firms have adjusted their risk levels to satisfy the target failure
rate.
Second, we note that the establishment of a regulatory cut-off may actually reduce the
amount of risk information made available by the raters.  The rater could announce the
precise value of u and v for each borrower, but doing so will reduce the number of
borrowers who can get a favorable rating in the sense that we have used it, i.e. falling
within a group whose average risk of default is no greater than the regulatory threshold.
6 The highest values of D induce high systemic risk also, but for these values the borrower remains unrated.
7 Incidentally, the lower specific risk will also help lower the value of D, according to (5) above.
10Third, there is the consideration of the real economic resources c employed in the rating.
Not only is this a direct social cost, but it also induces riskier behavior by all borrowers
who pay it, regardless of ability.
A fourth possible bias arises if the rating agency bases the ratings on specific risk only.  It
is clear that this might be relevant when we consider that neither the bank nor the firm
has any interest in ensuring that the rating agency is actually giving an accurate rating.
Rather the contrary, as both stand to gain from a favorable rating.  The situation here is
different to that in bond market ratings, where the rating agency mediates the conflicting
interest of issuers and investors, and thus the agency's credibility depends on their ratings
having predictive power.
To be sure, we have assumed that some such credibility factor remains relevant for rating
agencies in the banking sphere, perhaps because they need to retain their regulatory
approval.  Therefore we assumed that ratings are not systematically biased.  But rare
systemic crises (the "bad" state) may not be taken into account in this attempt to avoid
being systematically biased.  In particular, the agency could choose to ignore risk choices
v and to give a rating to firms with u < 01  <  u+7rv,  i.e. firms whose default probability
conditional on the good state is adequate, but whose unconditional default probability is
below the regulatory threshold.  The average default rate of such firms will not exceed u
except and until the bad state is realized - at which date there will be a banking crisis
anyway.  If the rating agency's franchise extends only to the next banking crisis anyway it
has nothing to lose by awarding ratings to the less demanding standard.
8.  Conclusion
Allowing banks to lower capital backing for loans made to highly-rated borrowers may
result in a rating system that neither reveals risk information concerning borrowers, nor
protects the deposit insurance fund.  Part of the problem is the whole idea of basing
portfolio risk-evaluation on the sum of individual loan risks, but there are also important
incentive issues involved.
Our model formalizes the idea that the largest outlays of deposit insurers are chiefly in
times of systemic crisis, and gives reasons why use of agencies' individual ratings is
unlikely to be an effective early-warning system for the risk of systemic failure.  As such,
the use of ratings is likely to lull policymakers into a false sense of security.
While harnessing market information for improving bank safety is an important and
valuable concept (for example, by increasing the role of large, well-informed but
uninsured claimants), this particular approach could be counterproductive.
Reliance on ratings could induce borrowers to increase their exposure to systemic risk
even if they reduce exposure to specific risk.  This danger highlights the hidden dangers
of allowing banks to hold less capital against rated borrowers.
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Figure  2:  Special case (i) --  Choice of risk level where only overall default risk matters.
Only for low values  of D/a will firms choose  safety;  therefore  at a given  value  of D, only
sufficiently  high ability  firms will choose  safety.
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Figure  3:  Special  case  (ii)-  Choice  of specific  and  systemic  risk  as  D  varies.
Lower  panel  illustrates  possible  switch  from  low risk vo to high  risk v, as D  declines.
14Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2340  Currency  Substitution  in Latin  Pere  Gomis-Porqueras  May  2000  M. Puentes
America:  Lessons  from the 1990s  Carlos  Serrano  39621
Alejandro  Somuano
WPS2341  The  Tyranny  of Concepts:  CUDIE  Lant Pritchett  May  2000  R.  Widuri
(Cumulated,  Depreciated  Investment
Effort)  Is Not Capital
WPS2342  What  Can  We Learn  about  Country  Martin  Ravallion  May  2000  P.  Sader
Performance  from  Conditional  33902
Comparisons  across  Countries?
WPS2343  Ownership  and Performance  of  David  A. Grigorian  May  2000  D.  Brown
Lithuanian  Enterprises  33542
WPS2344 Designing  Direct  Subsidies  for  Vivien  Foster  May  2000  S. Delgado
Water  and Sanitation  Services:  Andr6s  G6mez-Lobo  37840
Panama-A Case  Study  Jonathan  Halpern
WPS2345 Information  and Modeling  Issues  in  Andres  G6mez-Lobo  May  2000  S. Delgado
Designing  Water  and  Sanitation  Vivien  Foster  37840
Subsidy  Schemes  Jonathan  Halpern
WPS2346  The  Middle  Class  Consensus  and  William  Easterly  May  2000  K. Labrie
Economic  Development  31001
WPS2347  Terror  as a Bargaining  Instrument:  Francis  Bloch  May  2000  P. Sader
A Case  Study  of Dowry  Violence  in  Vijayendra  Rao  33902
Rural  India
WPS2348  Taxing Issues  with Privatization:  Jack  M. Mintz  May  2000  G. Chenet-Smith
A Checklist  Duanjie  Chen  36370
Evangelia  Zorotheos
WPS2349  Trade,  Foreign  Direct Investment,  Kamal  Saggi  May  2000  R. Bonfield
and International  Technology  31248
Transfer:  A Survey
WPS2350 Multilateral  Trade  Liberalization  and  Maurice  Schiff  May  2000  L.Tabada
Political  Disintegration:  Implications  36896
for the Evolution  of Free  Trade  Areas
and  Customs  Unions
WPS2351 Environmental  Policy  and  Time  Peter  W. Kennedy  May  2000  Y. D'Souza
Consistency:  Emissions  Taxes  Beno^it  Laplante  31449
and Emissions  TradingPolicy  Research Working  Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2352  How  Stronger  Patent  Protection  in  Carsten  Fink  May  2000  L.  Tabada
India  Might  Affect  the Behavior  36896
of Transnational  Pharmaceutical
Industries
WPS2353  The  Sao Mateus-Jabaquara  Jorge  Rebelo  May  2000  S. Van Veldhuizen
Trolleybusway  Concession  in Brazil  Pedro  Machado  38722
WPS2354  When  the Bureaucrats  Move  out of  Yi Chen  May  2000  M. Yafi
Business:  A Cost-Benefit  Ishac  Diwan  34649
Assessment  of Labor  Retrenchment
in China
WPS2355 Greed  and  Grievance  in Civil  War  Paul  Collier  May  2000  A. Kitson-Walters
Anke Hoeffler  33712
WPS2356 Bureaucratic  Delegation  and Political  Philip  Keefer  June  2000  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Institutions:  When  Are Independent  David  Stasavage  37644
Central  Banks Irrelevant?
WPS2357 Evaluating  Carbon  Offsets  from  Kenneth  M. Chomitz  June  2000  J. Ancrum
Forestry  and Energy  Projects:  33512
How  Do  They  Compare?
WPS2358  Why Infrastructure  Financing  Daniela  Klingebiel  June  2000  M. Salehi
Facilities  Often  Fall Short  of Their  Jeff Ruster  37157
Objectives
WPS2359 Reducing  Carbon  Dioxide  Emissions  Will Martin  June  2000  L.  Tabada
Through  Joint Implementation  of  36896
Projects
WPS2360 Corruption  and  the Composition  of  Beata K. Smarzynska  June  2000  H. Sladovich
Foreign  Direct Investment:  Shang-Jin  Wei  37698
Firm-Level  Evidence
WPS2361  The  Welfare  Effects  of Private  Sector George  Clarke  June  2000  H. Sladovich
Participation  in Guinea's  Urban  Water Claude  Menard  37698
Supply  Ana Maria  Zuluaga
WPS2362  A Transitory  Regime:  Water  Supply  Claude  Menard  June  2000  H. Sladovich
In Conakry,  Guinea  George  Clarke  37698
WPS2363  Would  Collective  Action Clauses  Barry  Eichengreen  June  2000  S. Kpundeh
Raise  Borrowing  Costs?  An Update  Ashoka  Mody  39591
and Additional  Results